The Army faces a challenge of meeting global commitments in an era of shrinking budgets when no immediate peer competitor justifies a large standing army.
The Army faced a similar dilemma during the period of 1898 to 1941 when required to maintain a continuous presence in the Philippines, Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and Panama; additional emergent commitments along the southern border and overseas in China and Russia further exacerbated the strategic challenges facing Army leadership.
In a country traditionally wary of maintaining a large standing Army -and with no direct threat to justify having one -the Army of this period included several fundamental characteristics: a modest force able to expand rapidly through the use of strategic reserves; a well educated, professional cadre to facilitate mobilization; and, institutionalized force augmentation through the use of native soldiers. While inherent in the "Old Army," these attributes are largely absent from the modern Army. A return to these organizational characteristics may serve as an effective blueprint for guiding reform initiatives as the Army transitions to meet contemporary security challenges.
"THE OLD ARMY" 1898-1941: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE?
Before 1939 the United States Army was small, but it was professional. Its tiny officer corps was parochial but true. Its members devoted their time to the study of war, caring little what went on in the larger society around them. They were centurions, and the society around them not their concern.
When so ordered, they went to war. Spreading themselves thinner still, they commanded and trained the civilians who heeded the trumpets call. The civilians did the fighting, of course -but they did it the Army's way. to justify having one, this required the Army of the period to have several characteristics: It had to be relatively small, but able to expand rapidly through the use of reserves; it had to be highly selective, professional and well trained to accomplish much with a small force, as well as provide a skilled cadre for mobilization; finally it had to rely on native soldiers overseas to expand its capabilities and augment U.S. Army forces.
Experience with problems of mobilization during the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the need to maintain new global commitments dictated the need to maintain a larger standing force and a more readily mobilized reserve component in the event of larger scale conflicts. The basis for the changes the Army would make came from the writings of Colonel Emory Upton in a book published after his death, The Military Policy of the United States. Upton felt that the Army suffered from a number of problems which caused it to be militarily weak and slow to mobilize. He felt that chief among these problems was an over-reliance on state controlled militia, lack of a federally controlled volunteer reserve with federally appointed officers, and the lack of a comprehensive system of officer education to provide a professionally trained core for the Army when it mobilized. 2 Upton knew that maintaining a large standing Army was contrary to the American tradition, but felt that a properly trained and structured reserve and officer corps would allow rapid mobilization, stating, "We cannot maintain a great Army in peace, but we can provide a scheme for officering a large force in a time of war." 3 His
proposed solution was to maintain a three tiered system of a Regular Army, a federally only the overseas units manned at full strength. 5 In spite of this, however, it was quickly able to expand to many times its peacetime size on two occasions, and then drawdown to a sustainable size in the conflict's aftermath. conscription and by mobilizing the standing reserve force which was principally the National Guard. Through legislation, the Army was gradually able to expand its influence over the Guard in an effort to achieve -at least to some degree -the federally controlled reserve envisioned by Upton. Additionally, the Army developed a unique system for procuring reserve officer manpower via the Reserve Officer Training Corps ROTC had its origins in the Morrill Act of July 2, 1862 which established the Land Grant colleges. Under the Act the Land Grant colleges were to provide for instruction in military tactics. 13 Many colleges made participation in these programs compulsory since state legislators interpreted the Morrill Act, and later National Defense Act of 1916, as making ROTC compulsory for male students. This tradition continued at many schools with ROTC being compulsory on more than half of all campuses that had programs and at two thirds of the Land Grant colleges through the 1950s. 14 The program was designed to provide officer manpower for a greatly expanded reserve force. The intent was that ROTC trained officers would be professional and competent enough to fill the company grade ranks in the event of mobilization, but that relatively few would move on to the field grade ranks or become general officers. 15 Mobilization during World War I, while smoother than experienced during the Spanish-American War, still highlighted some areas for improvement. The need for a large number of trained officers was met to a degree. The Officer Reserve Corps and ROTC provided 89,500 Reserve officers for the war effort, but one third of them were medical professionals. 16 There was still a great need for combat officers which required heavy reliance on Officer Training Schools, the precursor to Officer Candidate School, and early graduation of West Point classes. 17 Of concern to the states was the Army practice of breaking up many National Guard units and using the personnel as replacements to units of a greatly expanded wartime Army. This created strong resentment among National Guard personnel.
There were several proposals advanced to remedy these shortcomings. Table 2 : Percentages of USMA class graduates still serving on active duty at five year intervals. 27 Once commissioned, the Army based promotion of officers upon competitive examination through the rank of major. This was a holdover from the 19 th century when in 1890 the War Department prescribed a set of examinations for promotion through the rank of major. These examinations covered a range of military subjects and were augmented by a system of installation level schools which units required their junior officers to attend.
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What made the Regular Army officers true experts in their profession was the rigorous schooling system instituted by Secretary of War Root as outlined by Upton.
The details of the system evolved over time, but followed an outline that we still recognize today: a basic "garrison school;" an advanced course or "School of the Line;" a staff college, and a war college. The schools, with the exception of the War College were competitively graded and the Army rewarded superior performance. Officers in the garrison school who achieved a 95 percent score or higher in a subject area were exempt from having to take the promotion exam in that area for the next five years. A score between 90 and 94 percent exempted the officer from that subject for three years.
Potential and merit demonstrated in garrison school lead to an officer's selection for the School of the Line, which was the first year curriculum at the General Service and Staff
College at Fort Leavenworth. Selection was highly competitive since infantry and cavalry regiments could send only one officer to each course, and the engineer and artillery branches could only send two to three. Of those attending the School of the Line, the faculty only selected about half to attend the second year Staff College course. 29 The School of the Line and Staff School were academically rigorous with many graded requirements. The goal of most School of the Line students was to make high enough grades to be selected for the second year Staff College course. There were many graded tactical problems as well as military history, military law, and foreign language instruction. Many students of the era recalled long, strenuous days, devoted to the classroom, after hours study, and field exercises. George C. Marshall, a member of the class of 1907, declared it "the hardest work I ever did." 30 While the pressure of grading was not quite as heavy in the Staff College during the second year, it was still highly competitive as officers believed that one's class standing would determine future assignments and promotion. 31 It was in this class that the student officers began to learn how to master large scale tactical problems involving divisions and corps. The course of instruction helped the officers "visualize the command of large units." 32 This was particularly important in light of the fact that in peacetime the Army did not have the number of troops needed for large scale maneuvers. J. Lawton Collins, both a student and an instructor at Leavenworth, stated:
"It was at Leavenworth that most of our senior commanders, few of whom had commanded a combat unit larger than a battalion, learned the techniques of commanding large units." Throughout the 1920s, and 1930s, the courses of instruction were expanded, modified and updated, but kept their essential selectiveness, structure and rigor. The officers of that era would alternate between tactical assignments and school assignments as both instructors and students. The net effect was to provide the Army with a cadre of highly trained officers who would be able to adapt to the challenges posed by contingency operations, large scale mobilization and large unit command. The system would again prove itself in combat. Thirty-four of the generals who commanded corps during World War II spent ten or more years in the Army school system prior to the war. 36 General J.
Lawton Collins, one of those corps commanders, stated that during the rapid expansion of the Army as it mobilized for World War II, "The thing that saved the Army was the school system." United States strayed from this model during the Cold War due to the need to maintain a much larger standing Army than was our historical norm. While the system the Army devised was not perfect, we must return to its key elements, and improve upon its weaknesses.
Overall size of the army must ultimately be determined by balancing strategy against budgetary realities. Upton's formula of 1,000 Regulars for every 1,000,000 of population was probably too small for the requirements placed upon the Army.
Throughout the period 1898-1841, the Congress never maintained the Army at its full  Return to the practice of promotion examinations and competitive selection for officer education, and restore academic rigor to the service school system.
A vital mission, the Army must ensure requisite conventional personnel are trained in this specialty beyond those provided by Special Forces.
 Make Security Force Assistance and the advising of indigenous troops a key consideration in operations and thoroughly address this competency in the Army education and training system. Ensure that the Army is very selective in who conducts this mission.
We have never been able to predict the future with certainty, but we have devised systems in the past that were flexible enough to adapt to myriad crises and
